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A THEORY OF DISCIPLINE FOR PROFESSIONAL 
MISCONDUCT 
 
Nadia N. Sawicki* 
 
The current system of physician discipline is in disarray.  Critics in 
recent years have denounced state medical boards for inappropriately 
screening applicants for medical licensure, failing to discipline dangerous 
physicians, and generally being lax in their oversight duties at the expense 
of a vulnerable public.  At the same time, however, there are few 
meaningful limitations on the scope of medical board authority in matters of 
professional discipline, and the disciplinary actions boards do take often 
seem to bear only a tangential relationship to the competent practice of 
medicine.  
This Article maintains that if medical boards want to avoid charges 
of ineffectiveness – or worse, irrelevance – in achieving public goals, they 
must undertake a systematic review of their priorities with respect to 
professional discipline.  Specifically, boards should recognize that 
disciplining character-related misconduct or criminal behavior occurring 
outside the scope of medical practice may not be consistent with the 
foundational principles underlying the legislative delegation of disciplinary 
authority – namely, concern for public protection tempered by 
constitutional fitness to practice requirements.  This Article proposes that 
boards concerned about character and professionalism instead consider 
whether a physician’s conduct implicates any of the core professional 
values of medicine (among them, respect for fiduciary principles), and 
explains why a theory of discipline grounded in core values is preferable to 
a few proposed alternatives.  
 
                                                 
* George Sharswood Fellow in Law and Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School.  J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.Be., University of 
Pennsylvania School of Medicine; B.A., Brown University.  The author extends special 
thanks to the organizers and participants of the 2008 Health Law Scholars Workshop 
sponsored by the St. Louis University School of Law and the American Society of Law, 
Medicine, and Ethics, particularly commentators Sandy Johnson, Diane Hoffman, Rebecca 
Dresser, and Ana Iltis.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The current system of medical discipline is in disarray.  Since the 
1970’s, state medical boards have faced criticism from a variety of sources 
for inappropriately screening applicants for medical licensure, failing to 
discipline dangerous physicians, and generally being lax in their oversight 
duties at the expense of a vulnerable public.  At the same time, however, 
few constraints exist to limit medical board authority in matters of 
professional discipline, and the disciplinary actions boards do take often 
seem to bear only a tangential relation to the competent practice of 
medicine.  As the rate of medical malpractice claims continues to rise,1 and 
media reports publicize cases of physician misbehavior going unpunished,2 
some scholars have gone so far as to question whether the American system 
of professional discipline offers any real-world benefits at all.3   
This Article argues that it does.  Those who challenge the relevance 
of professional discipline in American medicine on the basis of its failures 
of implementation miss the point.  That the modern system of medical 
board discipline has been unsuccessful in achieving public goals is no 
reason to abandon the system altogether.  Instead, health law scholars ought 
to clearly identify the goals of professional discipline, identify how and why 
medical boards have failed to achieve these goals, and propose solutions for 
                                                 
1 Claudia H. Williams and Michelle M. Mello, “Medical Malpractice: Impact of the 
Crisis and Effect of State Tort Reforms,” Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Policy Brief 
No. 10 (May 2006). 
2 See, e.g., Cheryl W. Thompson, D.C. Board Rarely Punishes Physicians, 
Washington Post (April 11, 2005) at A01; Doug J. Swanson, Drug Past, Discipline, Didn’t 
Stop Doctor, Dallas Morning News (July 1, 2001), at 1A. 
3 See, e.g., C. H. Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer's Case 
for Abolition, 9 Am. J. L. & Med. 335, (1983); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of 
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Chicago L. Rev. 6 (1976); Anthony Ogus, Rethinking Self-
Regulation, 15 Oxford J. Legal Studies, 97 (1995); Shirley V. Svorny, Physician 
Licensure: a New Approach to Examining the Role of Professional Interests, 25 Econ. 
Inquiry 497 (July 1987).  Economists, in particular, have long made similar arguments, 
questioning the value of licensure and self-regulation in highly insulated and self-protective 
professions, like medicine.  These authors and others suggest that medical quality and 
patient safety could be better safeguarded through market-based solutions that close the 
information gap between physicians and consumers.  While some steps have been taken in 
this direction (see, for example, the website of the Massachusetts Board of Registration in 
Medicine, http://profiles.massmedboard.org, which allows patients to search for physician 
profiles, including malpractice payments made in the past ten years), it is highly unlikely 
that the current system of medical licensure would be abandoned in the foreseeable future.  
Accordingly, this Article does not pursue alternatives to medical licensure and discipline as 
a means to protecting patient health, but rather evaluates realistic improvements that might 
be made to the existing system.  
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remedying these failures.   
This Article approaches this challenge by focusing on one context in 
which medical board actions seem ill-attuned to the legal principles 
underlying professional discipline: discipline for character-related 
misconduct occurring outside the clinical sphere.  Consider, for example, a 
Nevada board’s recent decision to discipline a chiropractor for 
unprofessional conduct after he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
for shoving a man at a car wash.  In recent years, physicians have been 
disciplined on grounds as varied as tax fraud,4 failure to facilitate review of 
child support obligations,5 soliciting sex in a public restroom,6 possession of 
marijuana for personal use,7 and reckless driving involving alcohol,8 as well 
as other conduct that allegedly brings the medical profession into disrepute.  
While exact figures are hard to come by, best estimates suggest that less 
than thirty percent of medical disciplinary actions are taken on the basis of 
negligent medical practice.9  Moreover, because actions taken on the basis 
of character-related misconduct are representative of many of the 
overarching problems that plague the medical disciplinary system, crafting 
a theory that explains why and when boards can discipline for character-
related misconduct will help boards better exercise their disciplinary 
discretion in all contexts. 
Part II of this Article traces the development of the modern 
American medical disciplinary system, and looks to the constitutional 
underpinnings of medical board authority to identify its underlying goals.  
Part III demonstrates that medical boards often fail to achieve these goals 
when they pursue disciplinary action against physicians who misbehave 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., In re Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 12 (Wash. 1958); Windham v. Board of 
Medical Quality Assurance, 104 Cal. App. 3d 461 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980). 
5 See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999) (holding that 
California’s requirement that professional licensees disclose their social security numbers 
so that the state can determine if they failed to pay child support does not violate due 
process because being current in child support and tax obligations is an element of moral 
character and therefore related to fitness to practice).  
6 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1012 
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1973) 
7 See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners, 41 Cal. App. 3d 924 (Cal. App. 
2d Dist. 1974). 
8 See, e.g., Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002). 
9 See Darren Grant & Kelly C. Alfred, Sanctions and Recidivism: An Evaluation of 
Physician Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 Journal of Health Politics Policy and 
Law 867 (October 1, 2007), compiling data from the Federation of State Medical Boards 
identifying negligence-related disciplinary codes as follows: Negligence (14.5%); Failure 
to Conform to Minimal Standards of Medical Practice (12.2%); Gross Negligence (7%).  
Grant and Alfred also cite data compiled by Public Citizen Research Group identifying 
18.8% of sanctions as relating to “substandard care, incompetence, negligence.”  
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outside the clinical sphere, and posits a few possible explanations for why 
this is the case.  Part IV offers a proposal for tying character-related 
discipline to fitness to practice, and explains the implications of this 
approach for professional discipline more broadly.  Finally, Part V 
identifies weaknesses in three traditional arguments in support of boards’ 
broad exercise of disciplinary discretion.  
 
II.  PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE IN AMERICAN LAW 
 
This Section describes the legal underpinnings of the current 
American system of medical licensure and discipline, traces its historical 
development, and briefly describes how the system currently operates in 
practice.  Drawing on the constitutional justifications for professional 
licensure and discipline, this Section identifies two fundamental principles 
of the medical disciplinary system in American law – first, an emphasis on 
public protection (rather than punishment or compensation); and second, a 
recognition that the scope of professional discipline is not all-
encompassing. 
 
A.  Medical Board Authority: History and Practice 
Among the unenumerated powers reserved to each state under the 
Tenth Amendment is the power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizenry, commonly known as the police power.10  As explained by the 
Supreme Court in Dent v. West Virginia, it is the “power of the state to 
provide for the general welfare of its people [that] authorizes it to prescribe 
all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them 
against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of 
deception and fraud.”11  It is pursuant to their police powers that states are 
authorized to regulate law, medicine, and other professions, which they 
typically do by delegating authority to professional licensing boards.   
As a constitutional grant of authority, this story is a relatively simple 
one.  But for those familiar with the history of medical licensure, it is much 
more complex.  The first state medical boards were created in the late 1800s 
when private medical associations pushed state legislators to adopt laws 
regulating the practice of medicine.12  These efforts were driven by 
                                                 
10 U.S. Const. Amend. X; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872) (describing 
the police power as extending “to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and 
quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the State”). 
11 Dent v. W.Va., 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). 
12 Paul Starr, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, 102-06 (1984); 
Ronald L. Akers, The Professional Association and the Legal Regulation of Practice, 2 
Law & Soc'y Rev. 463, at 465-67 (1967).  
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physicians who, fearful of incursions on their territory by “irregulars” and 
“quacks,” were convinced that well-drafted legislation – far from being self-
defeating – could serve an important role in protecting their professional 
interests.13  Though some historians suggest that professional self-
protection, rather than concern for patient safety, was the driving force 
behind these lobbying efforts,14 the medical practice acts that resulted were, 
as a matter of law, clearly adopted pursuant to the legislative authority to 
protect public health and safety. 
At a minimum, the modern medical practice act defines the practice 
of medicine, establishes the requirements for medical licensure, and sets 
forth procedures for disciplinary action against licensees.15  The medical 
practice act also establishes the composition of the state board of medicine, 
the administrative agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the 
act’s provisions through its rulemaking and adjudicative powers.16  Modern 
medical boards generally include some public members, but are dominated 
by physicians appointed by the governor.17  
Modern American licensure laws are exclusive; that is, they grant 
qualified individuals the right to engage in the lawful practice of medicine, 
and prohibit the practice of medicine by unlicensed persons.18  The 
                                                 
13 Akers, at 465-67. 
14 See, e.g., Stanley J. Gross, The Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 American 
Psychologist 1109 (1978).  
15 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6521 (Definition of the Practice of Medicine), § 6524 
(Requirements for a Professional License), § 6530 (Definitions of Professional 
Misconduct).  See generally, Federation of State Medical Boards, ESSENTIALS OF A 
MODERN MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT (2006). 
16 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6523 (State Board for Medicine).  See also Douglas v. 
Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 170 (1923) (holding that the delegation of professional regulatory 
powers to an administrative board is consistent with the U.S. Constitution). See generally, 
Federation of State Medical Boards, ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT 
(2006); Federation of State Medical Boards, ELEMENTS OF A MODERN STATE MEDICAL 
BOARD (2006). 
17 See Carl F. Ameringer, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC 
PROTECTION, 48-51 (1999); M. Christine Cagle, J. Michael Martinez & William D. 
Richardson, Privatizing Professional Licensing Boards: Self-Governance or Self-Interest?, 
30 Administration Society 734, 750-51 (1999); Eleanor Kinney, Administrative Law Issues 
in Professional Regulation, in Timothy S. Jost ed., REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONS, 106 (1997).   
18 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6512 (Unauthorized Practice a Crime), § 6513 
(Unauthorized Use of Professional Title a Crime).  Contrast exclusive licensing laws with 
certification laws, which grant qualified individuals the right to use the title of physician in 
connection with their practice of medicine, and are exclusive only with respect to the use of 
that title, not with respect to medical practice generally.  Also contrast this with registration 
laws, which require that medical practitioners register their names with a state agency, but 
impose no qualification requirements or restrictions on practice.  See generally, Robert L. 
Hollings & Christal Pike-Nase, PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE IN THE 
 A THEORY OF DISCIPLINE 6 
Draft ~ Do Not Cite Without Permission 
 
 
 
requirements for obtaining a medical license are relatively consistent from 
state to state – generally, the applicant must be a graduate of an approved 
medical school, have completed at least one year of an approved graduate 
medical education program (residency or fellowship), and have passed the 
United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE).19  Beyond 
imposing educational and training requirements, many medical practice acts 
also require that applicants for medical licensure demonstrate good moral 
character.20  Some states also impose additional requirements, such as proof 
of malpractice insurance coverage;21 a clear criminal background check;22 
or age,23 citizenship,24 or residency requirements.   
Medical boards’ ongoing duties include periodic re-registration of 
licensees, which is typically contingent on their completion of specified 
hours of CME.25  However, medical boards rarely impose additional 
requirements intended to ensure the quality of care, such as mandatory 
recertification or random practice audits, upon physicians who have already 
received their licenses.26  Arguably, then, the most important of state 
medical boards’ oversight responsibilities with respect to medical quality is 
the discipline of professional licensees.   
The medical disciplinary process is generally reactive, rather than 
proactive.  It begins when a member of the public files a complaint, or, in 
the case of discipline on the grounds of criminal or civil liability, when a 
                                                                                                                            
UNITED STATES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND PROFESSIONAL RESOURCE, xvii-xix 
(1997).  For scholarly criticisms of exclusive licensure, see supra note 3.  See also Harris S. 
Cohen, On Professional Power and Conflict of Interest: State Licensing Boards on Trial, 5 
J. of Health Politics, Policy and Law 291 (1980); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of 
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Chicago L. Rev. 6 (Autumn 1976); Stanley J. Gross, The 
Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 Am. Psych. 1109 (1978); Eliot Freidson, PROFESSION 
OF MEDICINE, 23-24 (1988).   
19 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6524 (Requirements for a Professional License).  See 
generally, American Medical Association, State Medical Licensure Requirements and 
Statistics 2007 (2007) [hereinafter, “AMA Licensure Requirements”]. 
20 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6524(7).  See generally, Hawker v. N.Y., 170 U.S. 
189 (1898). 
21 See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Id. 859 (1976). 
22 See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-36 (2007)  
23 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6524(5). 
24 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6524(6); but see In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) 
(finding unconstitutional a Connecticut bar rule requiring bar applicants to be United States 
citizens).  
25 See AMA Licensure Requirements, at 48. 
26 Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, FEDERAL 
INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE STATE MEDICAL BOARDS’ PERFORMANCE, OEI-01-93-00020, at 5 
(Feb. 1993) (hereinafter, February 1993 OIG Report) (proposing that state medical boards 
take a more proactive role in assessing and assuring the quality of medical care after initial 
licensure examinations). 
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court or law enforcement agency files a report with the medical board.27  
The board screens, and, if appropriate, investigates the complaint; if the 
board finds the complaint is valid, it may exercise its discretion to pursue 
disciplinary action against the physician.  Subject to procedural due process 
requirements, discipline can range from oral or written reprimand to license 
revocation or suspension.28   
In addition to procedural due process, medical board proceedings 
are also constrained by principles of substantive due process, which limit 
the grounds upon which professional discipline can legitimately be 
imposed.29  The criteria for licensure and discipline may not be vague, 
arbitrary, or unattainable,30 and must have a “rational connection with the 
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice” his profession.31  Though the 
substantive grounds for professional discipline vary from state to state, most 
state medical practice acts authorize discipline for gross incompetence, 
physical or mental impairment, alcohol or drug abuse, practicing without a 
license or aiding the unlicensed practice of medicine, as well reciprocal 
discipline against those providers who have been subject to disciplinary 
action in other states.  Moreover, most states authorize discipline under a 
broad category of “unprofessional conduct,” which may include violations 
of codes of medical ethics, conduct that brings the medical profession into 
disrepute, or other unspecified forms of “dishonorable conduct,” including 
                                                 
27 See Timothy Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A 
Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 309, 310-11 
(1993); Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, STATE 
MEDICAL BOARDS AND MEDICAL DISCIPLINE, OEI-01-89-00560 (Aug. 1990) (hereinafter, 
1990 OIG Report).  Many of these reports are also filed with the National Practitioner Data 
Bank, a resource maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services that 
provides medical boards, hospitals, and other health care entities with “information relating 
to the professional competence and conduct” of licensed medical professionals.  
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, NATIONAL 
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: USEFULNESS AND IMPACT OF REPORTS TO STATE LICENSING 
BOARDS, OEI-01-90-00523, at i (Mar. 1993) (hereinafter, March 1993 OIG Report).   
28 Id. at 113, notes 76-78. 
29 The liberty component of the due process clause includes a right to choose one’s 
field of employment, and a medical licensure is thus considered a kind of property right. 
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889); see also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 
286, 291 (1999) (citing Dent). 
30 Id. 
31 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1959).  See also Dent at 
122 (“The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the 
judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or 
profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity 
can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation 
to such calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and application, 
that they can operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation..”). 
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criminal acts (typically felonies or “crimes of moral turpitude”).32 
Because states have broad latitude in determining how best to 
exercise their police powers, and because the loss of a medical license does 
not implicate a fundamental right, rational basis review is applied when 
evaluating the constitutionality of legislation in the realm of medical 
licensure and discipline.33  Medical board disciplinary determinations are 
reviewed under a similarly deferential standard34 
 
B.  Fundamental Principles of Professional Discipline in American Law 
The history and structure described above highlight three 
fundamental principles grounding medical boards’ disciplinary authority.  
Although, as demonstrated in Section III, these principles are not always 
reflected in practice, they serve as normative foundations for the delegation 
of professional regulatory powers under American law. 
First, the primary goal of and justification for professional discipline 
is public protection.  As an extension of the state’s police power, the 
medical board’s disciplinary authority is aimed at protecting medical 
consumers from the harms they may incur at the hands of incompetent or 
dishonest physicians.  This is reflected in the sanctions that may be imposed 
on physicians, which range from alerting the medical board and community 
of a potential for harm (via a public letter of reprimand) to withdrawing the 
physician’s right to practice (delicensure).  In other words, the goals of 
professional discipline are incapacitation and public protection; professional 
discipline does not serve to compensate victims, like civil law; or punish 
wrongdoers, like criminal law.35   
Secondly, while medical boards’ licensure and disciplinary authority 
is grounded in the state’s broad powers to protect public health, safety, and 
welfare, this authority is not all-encompassing.  It is limited in two ways – 
by substance and by degree.   
First, substantive due process demands that the grounds for licensure 
and discipline be rationally related to the practice of medicine.  In other 
words, if it is to serve as a meaningful limitation on medical board 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Educ. § 6530(20) (“Conduct in the practice of medicine which 
evidences moral unfitness to practice medicine”); § 6530(9). 
33 See generally, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 
(1955) (holding that a law “need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims 
488 to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it 
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”) 
34 See Kinney in Jost, at 114; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 327 U.S. 442, 470 (1954); 
Bettencourt v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 904 F.2d 772, 774 (1st Cir. 1990). 
35 See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale Law 
Journal 491, 546 (1985) (noting that the rationale for attorney discipline in not to punish, 
but rather to protect the public). 
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authority, the substantive due process requirement implies that there are 
some criteria that do not satisfy this standard.  For example, while requiring 
that physicians counsel their patients about the importance of voting in local 
and national elections would likely further the public good, it would not be 
a proper subject for medical licensure or discipline.  As a matter of practice, 
the dominance of physicians in the composition of state medical boards 
tends to support this understanding. That is, in relying on administrative 
boards dominated by physicians for the implementation and enforcement of 
licensure and discipline laws, the American system implicitly recognizes 
that professional members are better situated to evaluate the unique 
question of fitness to practice; a board composed of laypeople would have 
much greater difficulty evaluating, for example, whether a licensed 
physician’s practice is consistent with the standard of care in his medical 
community.   
Furthermore, as a matter of degree, professional licensure and 
discipline standards are established to ensure a minimal level of 
competence, rather than to identify aspirational standards of professional 
conduct.  That is, the criteria for professional licensure establish a floor 
beyond which practitioners may not drop, rather than an ideal towards 
which they must strive.  In other words, though we view a medical license 
as evidence that a physician possesses the basic tools necessary to practice 
medicine safely, the license does not ensure that he will actually use these 
tools correctly, and does not distinguish the merely competent provider 
from the excellent provider – that level of distinction takes place at the 
marketplace level. This principle is reflected in fact that our jurisprudence 
identifies the professional license as a property right requiring due process 
protections, and requires that the standards for licensure and discipline be 
reasonably attainable.  Though licensure requirements were implemented in 
an effort to improve the quality of medical care (and, in turn, public health), 
they were bounded by the recognition that imposing excessive regulations 
would severely limit the number of licensed physicians available to serve 
the community.  Enacting overly aspirational or stringent licensure laws, 
scholars often note, may have the counterintuitive effect of actually 
decreasing public health as compared with a purely free market system. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this Article, I propose a relatively 
uncontroversial definition of fitness to practice that is specific enough to be 
constructive but does not incorporate too many normative assumptions or 
prejudices about appropriate grounds for professional discipline.36  The 
definition provides that an individual will be deemed fit to practice 
medicine if he possesses the basic qualities needed to practice medicine in a 
                                                 
36 [Consider how thoroughly to address potential challenges to this notion of fitness to 
practice, despite its being relatively uncontroversial.] 
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manner that does not cause harm to his patients.  At a minimum, he must 
possess: (a) scientific knowledge of the human body and its functions, 
obtained by way of education; (b) the practical skill to implement this 
knowledge safely, obtained by way of a residency, fellowship, or other 
hands-on experience, as well as the physical ability to do so; and (c) the 
moral reasoning needed to understand that his medical knowledge and 
experience should not be used to harm patients.  In effect, fitness to practice 
is best understood as a “toolkit” of basic skills that each professional must 
have before he begins practicing.  Although the state will grant licenses 
only to those who demonstrate that they have the right “tools,” state 
licensure cannot ensure that the licensed professionals will always use these 
“tools” in the right way.   
These guiding principles for professional discipline in American law 
should be relatively uncontroversial.  While critics of the current 
disciplinary system may question whether these principles accurately 
describe the system as it has been implemented in practice, as a matter of 
theory, these principles are not only sound, but desirable.  
 
III.  PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE BY MEDICAL LICENSING BOARDS: 
CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS 
 
Despite the fact that the theoretical underpinnings of the American 
medical disciplinary regime are sound, the system as practically 
implemented boasts few supporters.  Both physicians and critics outside the 
professional sphere routinely question medical boards’ disciplinary 
priorities and challenge their exercise of disciplinary discretion.  Indeed, 
many disciplinary actions, particularly those taken in response to physician 
misconduct outside the clinical realm, seem to stray from the fundamental 
principles of public protection and fitness to practice described previously.  
This Section offers a few likely explanations of why medical boards act in 
this manner, and concludes that it may be because boards lack clear 
guidance as to the proper goals of professional discipline, and are often 
pressured by political and public interests to address “noisy” cases of 
physician misconduct. 
 
A.  Challenging the Frequency and Quality of Medical Board Discipline 
The criticisms that have been levied against medical boards 
generally fall into two categories.  On the one hand, medical professionals 
and others concerned with prioritization of board resources criticize boards 
for being less responsive to issues of medical safety than to public outcry in 
setting disciplinary priorities.  Consumer advocates, on the other hand, 
charge that as a quantitative matter, boards do not discipline physicians 
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often enough to have a substantial impact on patient safety and public 
health.37  This Section considers each challenge in turn. 
As a historical matter, low rates of professional discipline have been 
the primary drivers of public discontent with medical boards.38  Since the 
1970’s, critics have argued that medical licensing boards are simply not 
doing enough to protect patients.  While these challenges have resulted in 
some cyclical variation in the frequency of professional discipline39 as well 
as legislative broadenings of medical board authority,40 recent estimates 
suggest that less than one-half of one percent of licensed physicians face 
serious discipline annually.41  Moreover, critics continue to cite high rates 
of medical malpractice to support their arguments that professional 
discipline is ineffective in protecting the public and improving the quality of 
medical care.42  In sum, these criticisms challenge whether boards are 
effectively accomplishing the public protection goals of professional 
discipline.  
On the other hand, boards also face qualitative challenges, primarily 
from practicing physicians who have been disciplined for unprofessional 
conduct but who contend that their behavior, while possibly indicative of 
poor personal judgment or character, is not relevant to their fitness to 
practice medicine.  Challenged categories of misconduct include tax fraud,43 
                                                 
37 These competing complaints call to mind the old joke memorialized by Woody 
Allen in his film, Annie Hall.  As his character, Alvy Singer, tells it, “Two elderly women 
are at a Catskill mountain resort, and one of them says, "Boy, the food at this place is really 
terrible." The other one says, "Yeah, I know; and such small portions."” 
38 See Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare Professionals, in 
REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS (Timothy S. Jost ed. 1997), at 21-22; 
Carl F. Ameringer, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC PROTECTION 
(1999), at 5. 
39 See Jost, supra note 38, at 21-22; Ameringer, supra note 38, at 5.   
40 See Kevin B. O’Reilly, Doctor Disciplinary Actions Down for Third Year, AM. 
MED. NEWS (May 12, 2008) (reporting that Indiana, New Mexico, and Washington enacted 
legislation in 2008 to “beef[] up board authority,” and that nine other states are considering 
similar changes).   
41 See Public Citizen Health Research Group, Ranking of the Rate of State Medical 
Boards’ Serious Disciplinary Actions, 2005-2007 (HRG Publication #1837) (2008), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/medicalboardtable.pdf; see also Ameringer, 
supra note 38, at vi, 2; Jost, supra note 38, at 25 (noting that medical boards are no worse 
than other professional licensing boards in addressing disciplinary problems). 
42  This sentiment is shared by even some medical board members.  See Randall R. 
Bovbjerg, Pablo Aliaga & Josephine Gittler, STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING 
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES (2006), at 33 [hereinafter, State 
Discipline of Physicians]. 
43 See In re Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 12 (Wash. 1958); Windham v. Board of Medical 
Quality Assurance, 104 Cal. App. 3d 461 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980) (finding it “difficult to 
compartmentalize dishonesty” in such a way that a person who is willing to evade his 
federal income taxed would nevertheless be “considered honest in his dealings with his 
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soliciting sex in a public restroom,44 possession of marijuana for personal 
use,45 reckless driving involving alcohol,46 and witness intimidation.47  
Consider, for example, the case of Dr. Ansar, a physician practicing at a 
veterans’ hospital who, in the midst of a bitter divorce and custody dispute, 
called the police to report that his wife had attacked him with a knife.48  In 
fact, Dr. Ansar’s injury was self-inflicted, a feeble attempt to gain 
advantage in the legal proceedings.49  When the police arrived and Dr. 
Ansar realized that his wife would be handcuffed and taken into custody, he 
immediately recanted his statement, but was nevertheless charged and 
convicted of filing a false police report.50  Subsequently, the state medical 
board suspended his license to practice medicine for a full year on the 
grounds that Dr. Ansar had committed a “misdemeanor involving moral 
turpitude.”51  The board’s decision was upheld on appeal.52 
These cases extend beyond the realm of anecdote, however.  Federal 
studies by the Office of the Inspector General conducted in the 1980’s and 
1990’s concluded that medical boards rarely take action on the basis of 
incompetence or poor quality of care, choosing to concentrate instead on 
cases of drug diversion, drug or alcohol abuse, and criminal convictions.53  
“[W]e’ve never had a disciplinary action based on malpractice,” reported 
one medical board director.  “[W]hen there is a malpractice case, we tend to 
                                                                                                                            
patients.”) 
44 See McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1012 (Cal. 
App. 2d Dist. 1973) 
45 See Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners, 41 Cal. App. 3d 924 (Cal. App. 2d 
Dist. 1974). 
46 See Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002). 
47 See McDonnell v. Commission on Medical Discipline, 483 A.2d 76 (Md. 1984) 
(reversing a medical board’s decision to discipline a physician who was being sued by a 
formed patient for medical malpractice where the physician allegedly engaged in the 
intimidation of expert witnesses); In re Lustgarten, 629 S.E.2d 886, 892 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2006) (reversing the North Carolina Medical Board’s decision to discipline a physician 
testifying as an expert witness for allegedly testifying that another physician was testifying 
falsely).   
48 Ansar v. State Medical Board of Ohio, 2008 Ohio 3102 (2008). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  See Ohio Rev. Code 4731.22(B)(13) (providing that the state medical board 
“shall, to the extent permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend an individual's certificate to 
practice, refuse to register an individual, refuse to reinstate a certificate, or reprimand or 
place on probation” a physician who pleads guilty to or is convicted of “a misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude”).   
52 Id. 
53 Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, MEDICAL 
LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW, P-01-86-00064, at 13-14 (June 1986) 
(hereinafter, 1986 OIG Report); 1990 OIG Report, at 15. 
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look for another basis for disciplinary action.”  Furthermore, a more recent 
study based on data compiled by the Federation of State Medical Boards 
concluded that 25% of all serious medical disciplinary actions taken on the 
basis of a physician’s criminal conduct involve conduct that impacts neither 
patient care nor the medical system more broadly defined.54  And while 
precise figures are hard to come by, recent analyses of the frequency of 
various substantive grounds for discipline identify a significant portion that 
are not clearly linked to medical care or patient safety.55  Critics contend 
that disciplining physicians for these kinds of misconduct emphasizes 
aspirational standards, rather than standards that are clearly linked to public 
protection in the medical sphere.   
While both the qualitative and quantitative challenges are important 
to recognize, this Article focuses primarily on the qualitative challenges for 
three reasons.  First, because an unmediated focus on the rate of medical 
discipline alone is unlikely to tell us much about boards’ overall 
effectiveness in protecting public interests.56  The rate at which medical 
professionals face serious discipline is comparable to the rate of discipline 
in other professions57 as well as the rate of felony convictions among the 
American public.58  Giving these quantitative similarities, it is surprising 
that medical discipline alone would be subject to such criticism.59  
Secondly, given that the frequency of board discipline is significantly 
resource-driven,60 modifying boards’ disciplinary priorities is likely to be 
more effective than pushing for increased rates of discipline when resources 
are scarce.  Imagine the potential impact if all the resources spent by 
                                                 
54 P. Jung, P. Lurie & S. M. Wolfe, US Physicians Disciplined for Criminal Activity, 
16 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 335 (2006).  
55 Grant and Alfred, at 875 [insert parenthetical with data from Table 2] 
56 See, e.g., Grant and Alfred at 872 (“[I]t would be preferable not to assess board 
effectiveness by the rate of discipline alone.”); Timothy Jost et al., Consumers, 
Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 Health 
Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 309, 310 ([C]ounts of disciplinary actions … do not give 
us a full picture of board activity.”), 336 (“[E]valuating board success solely on the basis of 
formal disciplinary actions is inadequate because boards may be more active at the 
informal level than is commonly supposed.”). 
57 See Jost, supra note 38, at 25. 
58 According to the U.S. Department of Justice, nearly 1,145,000 adults were convicted 
of felonies in 2004.  U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal 
Sentencing Statistics, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sent.htm.  This represents 
less than one half of one percent of the United States population. 
59 Moreover, consider these data in terms of numbers rather than percentages.  If each 
of the 3,000 physicians seriously disciplined each year sees an average of 3,000 patients 
annually, then at least 9 million patient interactions are at risk annually.  See David 
Goodman, Twenty-Year Trends in Regional Variations in the U.S. Physician Workforce, 
Health Affairs (Oct. 7, 2004). 
60 See infra, Section III-B. 
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medical boards in disciplining character-related misconduct occurring 
outside the clinical sphere were instead redirected to address behavior with 
a more direct impact on patient health and welfare (for example, 
substandard care).61  Finally, evaluating boards on the basis of specific 
disciplinary actions is easier and likely to be more productive than 
considering the many actions that medical boards fail to take.  Because 
many of the “noisy” cases relating to character and professionalism test 
constitutional boundaries and ultimately face judicial scrutiny, they offer 
unique opportunities for clarifying the boundaries of permissible board 
discipline.  The lessons learned in these cases can then be used to provide 
guidance for professional discipline in other contexts as well. 
 
B.  Underlying Issues: Finance and Structural Independence 
If medical boards are failing to achieve the public goals with which 
they’ve been tasked, it is imperative to understand why this is the case 
before proposing any solutions.  While at least one prominent legal scholar 
has explored the motivations of state bar examiners in investigating attorney 
character,62 no similar studies have been done of state medical boards.63  
Accordingly, there is little consensus as to why medical boards choose to 
pursue discipline against certain kinds of physician misconduct but not 
others.  That said, at least a few potential explanations have been proposed.  
According to a 2006 report prepared for the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, high costs and limited financial and human 
resources are among the major obstacles to effective disciplinary 
enforcement by medical boards.64  Because of these resource limitations, 
boards generally take a reactive rather than proactive approach to medical 
discipline, and are often unable to investigate all the complaints that are 
made against physicians, necessarily triaging those of highest priority while 
leaving others unexamined.65  A recent empirical study seemed to confirm 
this finding, noting a correlation between the extent of a board’s financial 
                                                 
61 [Consider counterargument about relative cost of pursuing discipline against 
criminal conduct vs. negligent practice]  
62 Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale Law 
Journal 491 (1985).  
63 The only study that addresses similar themes in the medical context is Randall R. 
Bovbjerg, Pablo Aliaga & Josephine Gittler, State Discipline of Physicians: Assessing 
State Medical Boards Through Case Studies (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2006), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/stdiscp.pdf.   
64 Bovbjerg at 15-17, 38-41. See also Robert C. Derbyshire, How Effective is Medical 
Self-Regulation?, 7 Law and Human Behavior 193, 199 (1983); 1990 OIG Report, 6-8; 
1986 OIG Report, 2. 
64 Bovbjerg at  9, 14-15. 
65 Bovbjerg at 21, 35. 
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resources and its rate of discipline.66  These reports suggest that increasing 
medical boards’ budgets would go a long way towards increasing the 
frequency of medical discipline.  Moreover, to the extent that boards choose 
to pursue certain substantive categories of discipline rather than others on 
the basis of financial limitations – relying on court reports to identify 
physicians who have been convicted of criminal activity, for example, is 
likely to be less costly and labor-intensive than actively investigating 
physicians who provide medical care that consistently falls short of 
professional standards67 – perhaps increasing board resources might have an 
impact on the quality, not just the quantity, of professional discipline.  
Another common explanation for medical boards’ lax approach to 
professional discipline is that the boards are “captured” by professional 
interests or otherwise lack meaningful public oversight.68  Indeed, one of 
the most prominent criticisms of the medical profession in the 20th century 
has been that it is self-protective, monopolistic, and more attuned to the 
economic security of its members than to the welfare of the public at 
large.69  In the context of medical discipline, some have argued that the 
boards’ approaches to various substantive grounds for discipline are 
likewise driven by internal constraints within the medical community – for 
example, the push to improve the public standing of physicians by 
emphasizing their moral superiority (which, compared to their technical 
skill, is much easier for laypersons to judge).  
While there can be no denying that the history of American 
medicine is replete with examples of professional self-protection by the 
AMA and other private professional associations (as well as by individual 
physicians),70 it is not clear that these problems affect the physicians 
                                                 
66 M. T. Law & Z. K. Hansen, Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician 
Discipline: An Empirical Analysis.  See also Andis Robeznieks, Am. Med. News (quoting 
NY Health Department spokeswoman saying that increase in NY discipline was partly due 
to a double in licensing fees).  Possibly add note about source of medical board funding. 
67 See Bovbjerg; 1990 OIG Report, 10, 15 (noting that because quality of care inquiries 
tend to be time-consuming, “boards tend to look for another basis to take action.”); 1986 
OIG Report, 14.  Moreover, financial limitations mean that boards are often reactive rather 
than proactive, responding to consumer complaints or criminal reports, rather than 
initiating investigation on their own. 
68 See Bovbjerg at 45; Harris S. Cohen, On Professional Power and Conflict of 
Interest: State Licensing Boards on Trial, 5 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 291 
(1980).  See also Robert C. Derbyshire, How Effective is Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 Law 
and Human Behavior 193, 199-200 (1983) (citing Harris Cohen, Milton Friedman). 
69 See generally, PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
MEDICINE, 223 (1984) (discussing medicine’s historical opposition to the establishment of 
independent regulatory schemes for professionals such as midwives, chiropractors, and 
osteopaths). 
70 See, e.g., Matter of the Am. Med. Ass’n., 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (prohibiting medical 
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serving on state medical boards.  Arguably, the attitude of a physician 
appointed by the governor to sit as a member of the state agency responsible 
for interpreting and enforcing the state’s medical practice act is likely to be 
very different than that of the average practicing physician.71  Indeed, the 
2006 Health and Human Services report posited that medical boards may 
actually be able to act more effectively if they maintain statutory and 
structural independence from both political and professional interests. 72  
And a similar report dated 1990 identified state limitations on board 
authority as one of the most significant obstacles to expeditious and 
effective disciplinary review.73  A recent empirical study of the frequency of 
medical board discipline across various states agreed, finding that boards 
were more likely to take disciplinary action when they were more 
structurally independent from state government;74 boards with a higher 
proportion of public (that is, non-professional) members were found to be 
no more likely to engage in vigorous disciplinary enforcement.75  These 
data ultimately led the authors of the study to conclude that claims that “the 
medical profession has captured the regulatory apparatus” have been 
“overstated.”76  
 
C.  Lack of Legislative or Judicial Guidance 
The three issues described above – financial constraints, 
professional self-protection, and lack of independence, are unlikely to be 
resolved without significant political and professional buy-in.77   However, 
the boards responsible for professional discipline also face another 
significant challenge that can be more easily resolved – namely, a lack of 
                                                                                                                            
associations and state medical boards from enforcing their ethical guidelines regarding 
advertisement and price fixing); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 
1990) (upholding district court’s finding that the AMA violated federal antitrust laws by 
conspiring to eliminate the chiropractic profession).  [Add references to Tuskegee, 
Nuremberg, etc.] 
71 See Bovbjerg at 34; Derbyshire at 198-99. 
72 Bovbjerg at  9, 12-14, 14-15.   
73 1990 OIG Report, 8-9. 
74 Law and Hansen.  
75 Law and Hansen.  See also Andis Robeznieks, Public Active on Medical Boards, But 
Not Always Tougher on Doctors.  Am. Med. News Nov. 11, 2002 (noting that the 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana medical boards have physician-only membership, and 
have “some of the most aggressive disciplinary rates.”) 
76 Law and Hansen at 5.  
77  Increasing funding and structural independence, for example, would require strong 
support from state legislatures and executives.  Reducing the profession’s self-protective 
instincts, on the other hand, would take a significant amount of buy-in from the profession 
that is, quite frankly, unlikely to happen. See Robert C. Derbyshire, How Effective is 
Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 Law and Human Behavior 193, 199 (1983). 
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clear direction in setting disciplinary priorities.  Existing legal doctrine has 
neither adequately defined fitness to practice nor resolved the question of 
why personal character is relevant to safe and effective medical practice, so 
it is no wonder that boards face challenges in exercising their disciplinary 
discretion in a principled manner. 
As noted in Section II, legislatures grant medical boards disciplinary 
authority pursuant to broadly worded medical practice acts authorizing 
discipline for, among other things, “unprofessional conduct.”78  Although 
such language seems to provide little guidance for medical boards engaged 
in concrete disciplinary decisionmaking, courts have consistently upheld 
such broad categories of discipline, finding that they provide boards with 
the flexibility and discretion necessary to effectuate public goals.79  The 
North Carolina Supreme Court, for example, has consistently upheld 
unprofessional conduct statutes against challenges of vagueness and 
overbreadth.80  While acknowledging that there may be “room for 
difference of opinion” as to the outer edges of the concepts of 
“unprofessional” or “dishonorable” conduct, the court stated that “there is at 
and around the central core of these concepts much conduct which so 
clearly constitutes improper practice that few, if any, members of the 
profession would seriously claim to be unaware that such conduct is not 
consistent with these concepts.”81  Rather than impose upon states the 
burden of cataloging “every conceivable improper practice in which the 
licensee is forbidden to engage,” the court held that unprofessional conduct 
statutes be evaluated by reference to the test of “whether a reasonably 
intelligent member of the profession would understand that the conduct in 
question is forbidden.”82  Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court upheld 
a statute authorizing professional discipline for “moral turpitude” against a 
                                                 
78 See supra, Section II.   
79 As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Schware, the fact that the definition of moral 
character "has shadowy rather than precise bounds" and its determination "involves an 
exercise of delicate judgment” does not imply that a state may not require it as a condition 
of practice.  Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248-49 (1959).  For state 
court decisions rejecting vagueness challenges to professional discipline statutes, see, e.g., 
Brody v. Barasch, 155 Vt. 103 (1990) (“moral unfitness”); Ketring v. Sturges, 372 S.W.2d 
104, 111 (Mo. 1963) ("dishonorable conduct"); Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 
P.2d 1062, 1072-74 (Wash. 1991) (“moral turpitude”); Abrahamson v. Department of 
Professional Regulation, 568 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (“good moral 
character”), rev’d on other grounds, 606 N.E.2d 111 (Ill. 1992); Sanchick v. Michigan 
State Board of Examiners, 342 Mich. 555 (Mich. 1955) (“unprofessional, unethical and 
dishonest conduct of a character likely to deceive the public”). 
80 See, e.g., In re Wilkins, 294 N.C. 528, 548 (N.C. 1978); In re Guess, 327 N.C. 46, 
56 (1990) 
81 In re Wilkins, 294 N.C. 528, 548 (N.C. 1978). 
82 In re Wilkins, 294 N.C. 528, 548 (N.C. 1978). 
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vagueness challenge, noting that when the statute is “construed in relation 
to the purposes of professional discipline, considered in the context of a 
specific application, and supplemented by the shared knowledge and 
understanding of medical practitioners,” its content is sufficiently clear to 
put practitioners on notice that certain conduct is prohibited.83   
And yet, most courts attempting to define fitness to practice or 
explain how a particular category of professional misconduct relates to 
fitness are able to offer little more than circular reasoning in support of their 
conclusions. As noted by Deborah Rhode in her paradigmatic 1985 article 
on moral character as a credential for the practice of law, what passes for 
legal analysis in these cases is highly conclusory and “border[s] on 
tautology.”84  Even Hawker v. New York, the case which speaks most 
directly to the issue of character-related criteria for professional licensure 
and discipline, offers little guidance.  In Hawker, the Supreme Court upheld 
a New York state law prohibiting the practice of medicine by those who 
have been convicted of a felony, but provided little support for its 
conclusion that personal character is “as important a qualification as 
knowledge" for professional practice and is therefore subject to discipline.85  
In two brief sentences, the Court offered the following meager explanation 
of its conclusion: “The physician is one whose relations to life and health 
are of the most intimate character.  It is fitting, not merely that he should 
possess a knowledge of diseases and their remedies, but also that he should 
be one who may safely be trusted to apply those remedies.”86  While these 
factors serve to emphasize the importance of disciplining physicians 
compared to other professionals,87 they do not satisfactorily explain why 
any particular grounds for discipline are appropriate.  Indeed, most state 
                                                 
83 Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1074 (Wash. 1991) 
84 Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale Law 
Journal 491, 552 (1985). 
85 Hawker v. N.Y., 170 U.S. 189, 193 (1898).  Because the Supreme Court decided 
Hawker decades before it elucidated the fitness to practice requirement in Schware, the 
analysis in Hawker does not lend itself to an easy discussion of the connection between 
personal character and fitness to practice medicine. 
86 Id. at 194, 191 (No business “so directly affect[s] the lives and health of the people” 
as the practice of medicine); In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 826 (Wash. 1958) (“The daily 
practice of medicine concerns life and death consequences to members of the public”).  
87 See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1959) (In his 
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter wrote that because the legal profession is charged with the 
important responsibilities of “defen[ding] right and … ward[ing] off wrong,” it is 
particularly important that members of the profession have "a high sense of honor, [be] of 
granite discretion, [and] of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility.”); In re Polk, 
449 A.2d 7, 18 (N.J. 1982) (describing the less stringent burden of proof in medical 
disciplinary proceedings compared to legal disciplinary proceedings as reflecting “society’s 
important interest in life and health”). 
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court decisions in disciplinary matters simply conclude that moral character 
broadly defined is a necessary component of fitness to practice without 
providing adequate support for this assertion.88   
Substantive due process challenges to medical board disciplinary 
actions taken on the basis of unprofessional conduct statutes have resulted 
in equally unhelpful judicial analysis. Without providing strong 
justifications for their decisions, courts have held that professional 
discipline on grounds as varied as tax fraud,89 failure to facilitate review of 
child support obligations,90 soliciting sex in a public restroom,91 possession 
of marijuana for personal use,92 and reckless driving involving alcohol93 all 
fall within the boundaries of unprofessional conduct statutes and are 
reasonably related to the practice of medicine.  Consider, for example, In re 
Kindschi, a Washington Supreme Court case that set the precedent for 
numerous cases upholding medical discipline on character-related 
grounds.94  In Kindschi, the Washington Supreme Court upheld a medical 
board’s decision to suspend the license of a physician who had committed 
tax fraud, on the basis of a statute authorizing discipline for “unprofessional 
conduct,” including "conviction in any court of any offense involving moral 
turpitude."95  Finding “a rational connection between income tax fraud and 
one's fitness of character or trustworthiness to practice medicine,” the court 
held that the board’s discipline for tax fraud did not violate due process.96  
In justifying its decision on the grounds that the public “has a right to 
expect the highest degree of trustworthiness of the members of the medical 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Schware 
and concluding that “a state may require good moral character as a qualification for entry 
into a profession, when the practitioners of the profession come into close contact with 
patients or clients”); Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 443 N.E.2d 391, 395 
(Mass. 1982) (“A physician's bad moral character may reasonably call into question his 
ability to practice medicine.”); Foster v. Bd. of Medical Quality Assurance, 227 Cal. App. 
3d 1606, 1610 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1991) (a physician’s “intentional dishonesty” regarding 
his malpractice coverage “demonstrates a fundamental lack of moral character which is 
incompatible with the honesty required to properly maintain the doctor-patient 
relationship”). 
89 In re Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 12 (Wash. 1958); Windham v. Board of Medical 
Quality Assurance, 104 Cal. App. 3d 461 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980). 
90 Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999).  
91 McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1012 (Cal. App. 
2d Dist. 1973) 
92 Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners, 41 Cal. App. 3d 924 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 
1974). 
93 Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002). 
94 See, e.g., Deatherage v. Board. of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828 (Wash. 1997) 
(improper witness testimony). 
95 In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 825 (Wash. 1958). 
96 Id. at 826. 
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profession,”97 the Washington Supreme Court effectively paved the way for 
professional discipline against physicians who engage in any conduct 
suggesting untrustworthiness or violating “sound standards of conduct.”98   
Of course, there are good reasons for legislatures to grant medical 
boards such broad authority and for courts to defer to board decisions 
provided they satisfy a reasonableness test.  On the legislative side, given 
that professional expectations are likely to evolve over time and across 
various contexts, it would be problematic if unprofessional conduct statutes 
were drafted to capture specific and defined instances of misconduct, rather 
than offer a significant degree of flexibility.  Moreover, granting medical 
boards broad directives and allowing them to make judgments on their own 
without overly stringent judicial review is consistent with the principles of 
professional discipline that provide for physician-dominated boards as best 
suited to identify and enforce professional standards.99  While such a 
deferential stance may be appropriate as a matter of both law and policy, the 
meagerness of judicial discussion in professional discipline cases makes it 
difficult for boards to derive clear principles and guidelines for future 
action.  By failing to provide a fuller analysis in substantive due process 
cases, courts are missing a key opportunity to explain to boards why the 
boundaries of constitutional action lie where they do. 
Given the lack of guidance provided to boards by the legislatures in 
their initial grant of disciplinary authority and by the courts in their judicial 
review of disciplinary decisions, it is no wonder that the disciplinary actions 
taken by state medical boards are sometimes inconsistent with the principles 
of professional discipline.  In the absence of legislative or judicial guidance, 
boards are free to take action based not on sound theories of discipline, but 
on the pressures imposed by public officials, private interests, and the 
public, none of which are necessarily the best drivers of administrative 
decisionmaking.  This Article seeks to remedy this problem by clarifying 
the principles of professional discipline and proposing a theory that boards 
can use to prioritize action in the realm of character-related misconduct and 
beyond. 
 
IV. THE CORE VALUES THEORY OF MEDICAL DISCIPLINE: CONCEPT AND 
APPLICATION 
 
As described above, the modern system of medical discipline does 
not adequately take into account the fundamental principles of professional 
discipline outlined in Section II.  This Section proposes an alternative 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99  See supra, section II. 
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theory of discipline for professional misconduct that more appropriately 
accounts for these concerns – namely, one that focuses on the core 
professional values inherent in the most elemental understanding of fitness 
to practice.  Medical boards that wish to operate more effectively ought to 
be guided by this theory in setting disciplinary priorities and exercising their 
disciplinary discretion. 
 
A.  Respect For Core Medical Values as an Element of Fitness to Practice 
To satisfy the fundamental principles outlined in Section II-B, 
professional discipline must not only be aimed primarily at public 
protection, but must also be appropriately targeted at issues of fitness to 
practice narrowly defined.  A theory of discipline that does not incorporate 
these limitations is of little value to medical boards struggling to determine 
what kinds of disciplinary actions they can pursue consistent with their legal 
directives.  In contrast, a theory of discipline built to accommodate narrow 
character-based elements of fitness to practice can be extremely helpful to 
medical boards seeking disciplinary guidance.  
As described in Section II, even the most elemental definitions of 
fitness to practice encompass not only educational and training 
requirements, but also some aspects of moral reasoning, character, or 
professionalism.  However, most medical boards’ interpretation of the 
character- or professionalism-based element of fitness to practice is so 
expansive that it begs the question of whether there exists any kind of 
physician misconduct that actually falls outside the scope of the fitness to 
practice inquiry.  Clearly, some limitations must be imposed on disciplinary 
inquiries into character or professionalism.100  A core values-based theory 
of discipline, which posits that the only relevant moral question is whether a 
physician demonstrates respect for the core values of medical practice, 
serves this function well.  Pursuant to this theory, medical boards concerned 
with professionalism and character ought to identify these core medical 
values, and then pursue discipline only against those physicians whose 
behavior demonstrates disrespect for those values.   
This approach is consistent with the reasoning that some courts have 
adopted in reviewing medical board disciplinary actions.  While courts are 
reluctant to require proof of good character generally as an element of 
fitness to practice, they are more inclined to uphold professional discipline 
against physicians who demonstrate their disrespect for foundational 
medical values that are components of the fitness to practice inquiry.101   
                                                 
100 See, supra, Section II-B. 
101 Griffiths v. Superior Court 96 Cal.App.4th 757 (2002) (noting that driving under 
the influence of alcohol “threatens personal safety and places the safety of the public in 
jeopardy”); In the Matter of the Revocation of the License of Irwin Jacob Polk 90 N.J. 550 
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Among the key values and characteristics that judges have suggested bear a 
direct connection to the practice of medicine, honesty,102 compliance with 
the law,103 adherence to fiduciary principles,104 and respect for life, health, 
and bodily integrity105 have all been identified as relevant to fitness to 
practice and, in turn, medical discipline.106  Consider, for example, the 
thorough reasoning engaged in by a California court in upholding board 
discipline of a physician convicted of driving under the influence of 
alcohol.  The court in Griffiths, rather than making a summary statement 
that driving under the influence is indicative of poor character and therefore 
a proper subject of discipline, wrote a nuanced opinion carefully identifying 
the various ways in which the physician’s behavior demonstrated a lack of 
cognitive or moral skills necessary for medical practice.107  Among the 
physician’s demonstrated faults, noted the court, were disrespect for legal 
prohibitions against drinking and driving, the failure to apply scientific 
knowledge regarding the speed at which alcohol is absorbed into the 
bloodstream, and a lack of concern for his own bodily safety and that of 
                                                                                                                            
(1982) (noting that sexual abuse of patients results in psychological harm). 
102 See, e.g., Windham v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 104 Cal. App. 3d 461 
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980) (noting that forensic medical practice involves honesty in 
financial dealings with the government and private insurance carriers, honesty in reporting 
and testifying as to medical matters, and honesty and integrity in patient dealings); Griffiths 
v. Superior Court 96 Cal.App.4th 757 (2002) (“Honesty and integrity are deeply and daily 
involved in various aspects of the practice of medicine”); In Re License Issued to Zahl, 186 
N.J. 341(2006) (holding that the “panoply of dishonest acts” committed by the physician, 
including insurance fraud, “bespeak a fundamental disregard for truth which is ultimately 
inimical to the practice of medicine.”); Krain v. Medical Board, 71 Cal.App.4th 1416 
(1999) (“the intentional solicitation to commit a crime which has as its hallmark an act of 
dishonesty [perjury] cannot be divorced from the obligation of utmost honesty and integrity 
to the patients whom the physician counsels”). 
103 Griffiths v. Superior Court 96 Cal.App.4th 757 (2002) (noting that driving under 
the influence of alcohol “shows an inability or unwillingness to obey the legal prohibition 
against drinking and driving and constitutes a serious breach of a duty owed to society.”).   
104 In re Lesansky, 25 Cal. 4th 11, 16 (Cal. 2001) (identifying among the character 
traits necessary for the practice of law: trustworthiness, honesty, fairness, candor, and 
fidelity to fiduciary duties).  
105 Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757, 770 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002). 
(“Alcohol consumption quickly affects normal driving ability, and driving under the 
influence of alcohol threatens personal safety and places the safety of the public in 
jeopardy.”) 
106 Similar values, particularly the value of compliance with and respect for the law, 
may be relevant in reviewing bar discipline of attorneys.  While compliance with the law is 
arguably an even more important value for the legal profession, see Rhode at 570 
(“Abolitionists, civil rights activists, suffragists and labor organizers – indeed, the 
architects of our constitutional framework – all were guilty of ‘disrespect for law’ in 
precisely the sense that bar examiners employ it.”). 
107 Griffiths v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 757 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002). 
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other drivers on the roads.108  The conclusion reached by this court and 
others is that, if a physician’s conduct in his personal life demonstrates a 
failure to understand or respect the values essential to safe and effective 
medical practice, professional discipline may be appropriate.  On the other 
hand, professional values that are non-essential or aspirational in nature 
may be enforced as social norms within the medical profession, but are not 
an appropriate subject for legal discipline.109 
 
B.  Challenges in Application 
The benefit of the core values theory of discipline is that it gives 
direction to medical boards as to the appropriate exercise of disciplinary 
discretion, while still offering boards significant flexibility in applying this 
standard.  Unfortunately, this promising element of the theory is also the 
primary criticism against it.  From defining core professional values to 
determining what kind of behavior implicates those values, this theory 
offers boards a great deal of discretion, on its face doing little to solve the 
problem of boards’ unbridled exercise of disciplinary authority.  
Under the core values theory, the strongest predictor of substantive 
grounds for discipline will be the value or values that are identified as 
essential to medical practice.  Defining these values too broadly will 
exclude many physicians who are arguably fit to practice medicine; 
defining them too narrowly will allow practice by physicians who may be at 
a greater risk of harming patients.110  Unfortunately, there is little empirical 
research indicating which professional values are closely linked to safe 
medical practice and patient safety.  Accordingly, boards have little but 
common sense to turn to in identifying and selecting professional values, 
citing values as diverse as honesty, compliance with the law, adherence to 
fiduciary principles, and respect for life, health, and bodily integrity.   
Consider, for example, how disciplinary outcomes might differ if 
various state medical boards were to identify different core professional 
values as essential to medical practice.  If a board were to determine that 
respect for physical health and welfare is a value essential to the safe 
practice of medicine, then professional discipline would be justified against 
a physician convicted of assault and battery in a bar fight, on the grounds 
that his violent conduct indicates a lack of respect for others’ physical 
health and welfare.  In contrast, if another board deemed honesty essential, 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 See generally, David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988), 
128 (distinguishing between essential components of the professional’s role and mere “side 
constraints”). 
110 Moreover, the choice of who defines the values – boards, legislators, or courts – 
will be of great normative significance. 
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discipline might be justified upon a showing of any dishonest behavior by a 
physician in his personal relationships – for example, lying about his 
address to get his child into a good public school.  Where there is little 
consensus in identifying the core values essential for fitness to practice, 
there is also likely to be little consensus among boards as to the proper 
substantive grounds for professional discipline. 
Moreover, even if there were widespread agreement about which 
values are essential components of fitness to practice, controversy would 
still arise in determining what kind of behavior implicates those values.  
Consider, for example, if medical boards, legislators, and the public alike all 
determined that “respect for human life” was one core value that all 
physicians needed to possess in demonstrating fitness to practice medicine.  
A decisionmaker called upon to identify prohibited behavior that indicates 
disrespect for life might authorize professional discipline for elective 
abortions, physician assisted suicide, voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, 
lethal injection, as well as crimes of murder and manslaughter that take 
place outside the clinical sphere.  Although in all of these cases, as a 
definitional matter, a life is ended at the hands of a medical professional, it 
is important to note that there is widespread debate within the medical 
community about what it means to value life and whether activities such as 
physician assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia do, in fact, indicate a 
lack of respect for life.111  Similarly, identifying “respect for physical health 
and welfare” as a core medical value would be equally fraught with 
controversy.  While it is clear that physical assault and sexual abuse of 
patients demonstrates a lack of respect for bodily integrity, what about 
voluntary amputation and female circumcision, which are touted by some 
physicians and communities as legitimate ways of respecting patient 
values?  For any value that is identified as relevant to professional practice, 
decisionmakers will still likely disagree about its proper application in the 
disciplinary context. 
 
C.  Consensus for Fiduciary Duty as a Core Medical Value 
A partial solution to these problems may be found if we can identify 
a relatively uncontroversial professional value that the state, the public, and 
the profession can agree is a core component of medical practice.  While 
there may still be disagreement about how this value is expressed in 
personal conduct, any consensus that can be reached in identifying relevant 
                                                 
111 For example, supporters of physician assisted suicide argue that the role of the 
physician is not to preserve life at all costs, but rather to value the patient’s conception of a 
good life, which may in some cases involve facilitating his death.  Physicians who support 
abortions, for example, might argue that respect for human life does not require the 
preservation of an unwanted fetal life at the expense of an adult mother’s health or welfare. 
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values is likely to serve an important function in defining the boundaries of 
disciplinary inquiry. 
The principle of fiduciary duty in professional practice serves this 
function well.  Principles of fiduciary duty establish that fiduciaries 
entrusted with the care of vulnerable populations have a duty to act in the 
best interests of their beneficiaries, and must not use their positions of 
authority to benefit themselves or others at the beneficiaries’ expense.  Both 
in medicine and law, professionals and clients both recognize the 
importance of the fiduciary duty; indeed scholars have identified as one of 
the distinguishing characteristics of professions the fact that they have “a 
credible code of fiduciary ethics that is effectively enforced.”112  Moreover, 
courts commonly call on principles of fiduciary duty to justify professional 
boards’ disciplinary decisions and to demonstrate why the right to practice a 
profession should not be granted to those who demonstrate that they are 
likely to abuse that right.  For example, the Supreme Court in Hawker 
culled citations to state statutes and court decisions suggesting that 
physicians, even if technically competent, might abuse their positions of 
power in ways that are harmful to patients if they promise impossible cures, 
collect fees for ineffective treatments, or abuse patient confidences.113  One 
state court cited in Hawker expressed concern that the “unprincipled and 
vicious” not be given the right the right to “enter professionally the families 
of the worthy but unsuspecting and be admitted to the secrets which the sick 
chamber must often intrust to them.”114  Later opinions cite similar concerns 
about potential abuses of professional power, particularly relating to issues 
of confidentiality and privacy.115   
If the principle of fiduciary duty is used to narrow the scope of 
character-related inquiry for professional discipline, the next step is to ask 
                                                 
112 Michael J. Polelle, Who's on First, and What's a Professional?, 32 U. S.F. L. Rev. 
205 (1998).  
113 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189,  at 191 note 1, 194-95 (1898). 
114 Id. at 194-95. 
115 See, e.g., Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, 146 Cal.Rptr. 653, 662 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1978) (“[T]here is no other profession in which one passes so completely within the 
power and control of another as does the medical patient.”); Hughes v. State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 134 S.E. 42, 47 (Ga. 1926) (“[T]he relation of physician and patient is 
of such a confidential and serious nature, that not only the skill but also the moral character 
of the physician is of great importance to the interest of the patient and the state. It is 
important that only men of good character should practice medicine.”); Meffert v. State 
Board of Medical Registration & Examination 72 P. 247, 249 (Kan. 1903) (“The object 
sought is the protection of the home of the sick and distressed from the intrusion therein, in 
a professional character, of vicious and unprincipled men - men wholly destitute of all 
moral sensibilities. It was not the purpose of the lawmakers to clothe a man with a 
certificate of moral character, and send him out to prey upon the weak and unsuspecting - 
upon those who would be entirely at his mercy[.]”). 
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how this approach would play out in practice.  Generally speaking, there are 
three categories of physician misconduct that are likely to implicate 
fiduciary principles.  First, where a physician uses his clinical skills to cause 
harm to a patient or other beneficiary – consider physician assisted suicide, 
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, lethal injection, torture, or 
irresponsible prescription of controlled drugs.116  Second, where a physician 
uses his privileged position (but not his clinical skills) to cause harm to a 
patient or other beneficiary – consider sexual abuse of patients that is 
facilitated by the privacy of the doctor-patient encounter, and breaches of 
patient confidentiality.  Third, where a physician uses his privileged 
position to benefit himself without regard for his patient or other beneficiary 
- consider false expert testimony, Medicaid fraud, pharmacy theft, or even 
exceeding the speed limit on the basis of a nonexistent medical emergency.  
The common factor in all three scenarios is the physician’s abuse of his 
clinical skills or privileged position, by virtue of which he is granted unique 
access to vulnerable beneficiaries in the first place.117   Importantly, this 
approach categorically excludes some kinds of personal misconduct as 
irrelevant to questions of professional discipline – namely, those that do not 
implicate the physician’s clinical skills or privileged status, including many 
crimes that take place outside of the professional sphere (such as assault, 
murder, and fraud against non-patients), many instances of financial 
mismanagement or tax fraud in the personal sphere (such as failure to make 
child support payments), as well as simply poor personal judgment (such as 
marital infidelity).  If professional discipline for these kinds of misconduct 
is to be justified, it must be because they implicate some other professional 
value essential to the practice of medicine. 
However, relying on fiduciary principles to narrow the scope of 
disciplinary inquiry is only a partial solution, because even the 
uncontroversial value of fiduciary duty suffers from conflicts in 
interpretation.  There are normative implications as to how harm is defined 
and how beneficiaries are identified, and the malleability of these terms 
poses problems for the effective implementation of fiduciary principles as a 
limiting category for professional discipline.  For example, much depends 
                                                 
116 In each of these cases, the physician’s medical expertise is used to achieve a result 
that is, according to some, harmful to a fiduciary.  In physician assisted suicide, for 
example, the physician uses his knowledge of pharmaceuticals and his right to prescribe 
them to assist in the death of a patient.  In drug abuse cases, the physician uses those same 
skills in a way that arguably harms both the patient and any third parties to whom the 
patient diverts excess drugs.  In abortion cases, the physician terminates the life of an 
unborn fetus by using his clinical skills.   
117 Another line of inquiry might consider whether discipline would be appropriate 
against a physician who breaches his fiduciary obligations in a context unrelated to the 
practice of medicine (for example, as a trustee of a family trust). 
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on whether the patient is considered the physician’s only beneficiary, or 
whether the physician is understood to be a fiduciary for society more 
broadly.118  Defining the fiduciary role of the physician to include parties 
other than the patient might justify disciplining physicians who perform 
abortions, those who fail to report a patient’s infectious disease, and those 
who provide biased expert testimony, on the grounds that they are using 
their clinical skills or privileged positions to harm a third-party beneficiary.  
Likewise, the question of whether a physician’s conduct results in harm 
depends greatly on the definition of harm.  As explained above, some may 
argue that assisting a terminally ill patient’s voluntary suicide does not 
constitute a harm, while others may argue that ending a person’s life always 
constitutes a harm to that patient.  Still others might take the position that 
even if physician assisted suicide is not harmful to the patient, it can result 
in harm to society or other third-party beneficiaries.  Similar arguments 
could be made for participation in activities that are deemed harmful by 
some but not by others, including female circumcision, voluntary 
amputation, and prescription of medical marijuana. 
 
D. Benefits of the Core Values Theory 
Ultimately, then, even if there is widespread support for using the 
value of respect for fiduciary principles to narrow the scope of justifiable 
professional discipline, open questions of definition and interpretation make 
it an incomplete solution at best.  That said, there are some very real 
benefits to be gained by using a professional values analysis at every level 
of action, whether by legislators determining grounds for professional 
discipline, medical boards reviewing professional misconduct, or courts 
reviewing board disciplinary actions. 
First, using a values-based approach that emphasizes fiduciary duty 
will rid the disciplinary process of a significant degree of uncertainty and 
increase the likelihood of consistency in outcomes over time.  Currently, 
physicians aren’t being put on notice as to what kind conduct will subject 
them to discipline; boards aren’t getting adequate guidance from the courts 
about the constitutional limitations on professional discipline; and courts 
have very little principled jurisprudence to look to in evaluating due process 
challenges.  Given the fact that many state legislatures are currently moving 
to expand the scope of medical boards’ disciplinary authority in response to 
public concerns, it is particularly important that this authority be exercised 
in a principled way.  Using a medical values analysis that recognizes the 
importance of fiduciary duty, although it won’t be outcome-determinative, 
will help determine some categories of conduct that are relevant to 
                                                 
118 [Insert citations to articles discussing broader physician fiduciary duties, especially 
in the context of public health.] 
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disciplinary inquiries, and will categorically exclude others – for example, 
many non-violent felonies. 
Secondly, to the extent that boards have been criticized for taking an 
inconsistent approach to medical discipline – imposing lesser sanctions on 
providers who engage in tax fraud than those who engage in Medicare 
fraud119 – applying this kind of principled analysis may help redeem them 
in the eyes of the public.  It will set the stage for a more principled 
application of constitutional principles of due process in the context of 
professional discipline, which will help to ensure that medical boards 
exercise their disciplinary discretion in a manner that best serves the public 
interest. 
Finally, and most importantly, using a professional values analysis 
to reprioritize medical boards’ actions will free up boards’ limited resources 
so they can focus on the things that are arguably more likely to harm 
patients and the public – for example, gross incompetence, sexual assault of 
patients, and repeated violations of the standard of the care.  Given that 
financial problems are among the most significant systemic issues faced by 
modern medical boards, boards should take every effort to re-examine their 
disciplinary priorities and determine whether there might be a better 
allocation of resources that would result in more effective disciplinary 
enforcement.  This would, in turn, help boards respond to both the 
qualitative and quantitative criticisms of the approach they take towards 
physician discipline.  
 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CORE VALUES THEORY 
 
The core values theory of discipline, while somewhat ambiguous in 
its application, is nevertheless stronger than alternative theories purporting 
to justify the exercise of medical board disciplinary authority in cases of 
character-related misconduct.  This Section adresses three such theories, 
which, though intuitively appealing, justify a wider range of disciplinary 
action than is permitted under American law.  Whether grounded in 
prediction, trust, or social contract, each alternative theory arguably satisfies 
the state’s police power goals, but fails to take into account the fundamental 
legal principles underlying professional discipline, particularly the 
constitutional limitation that professional board action bear a rational 
relationship to fitness to practice. 
 
A.  Prediction Theory 
One of the arguments that courts have used to justify discipline for 
                                                 
119 See P. Jung, P. Lurie & S. M. Wolfe, US Physicians Disciplined for Criminal 
Activity, 16 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 335 (2006). 
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character-related misconduct outside the professional sphere is that it may 
be predictive of misconduct or error in clinical practice.  The Washington 
Supreme Court in Haley, for example, held that a physician’s conviction for 
tax fraud indicates a “lack of trustworthiness,” raising a “reasonable 
apprehension” that he might likewise “abuse the trust inherent in 
professional status.”120  Writing of the disciplined physician, the court 
explained its difficulty in “compartmentaliz[ing] dishonesty in such a way 
that a person who is willing to cheat his government out of $65,000 in taxes 
may yet be considered honest in his dealings with his patients.”121  In other 
words, if maintaining honesty in patient relations is an element of safe and 
effective medical practice, disciplinary action may be appropriate against a 
physician who engages in dishonest behavior in the personal realm on the 
grounds that he is likewise predisposed to dishonesty in the context of 
medical practice. 
While this argument has intuitive appeal, its empirical validity is 
highly controversial.  Scholars of psychology have long debated whether 
human behavior is primarily dispositional (that is, grounded in consistent 
character traits)122 or situational (that is, dependent on context and 
environment).123  Most contemporary theorists conclude that behavior is 
generally driven by both dispositional and situational factors,124 though the 
balance between the two may vary depending on context.  For example, 
dispositional or trait-based factors often have less predictive value in 
“strong situations” like workplaces, where personal behavior is narrowly 
prescribed and often dictated by norms, scripts, and routines.125  On the 
                                                 
120 Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991) 
121 Id.; see also Krain v. Medical Board 71 Cal.App.4th 1416 (1999) (holding that “the 
intentional solicitation to commit a crime which has as its hallmark an act of dishonesty 
cannot be divorced from the obligation of utmost honesty and integrity to the patients 
whom the physician counsels.”) 
122 See, e.g., Robert McCrae and Paul Costa, Jr., The Five-Factor Theory of 
Personality, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (Lawrence Pervin 
and Oliver John, eds., 2nd Edition, 1995). 
123 Situational behaviorists believe that, at heart, context matters: a tendency towards 
deceit in one’s personal life does not necessarily predispose a person to fraud in his 
professional life.  See, e.g., Walter Mischel, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT, 146 
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996) (“[T]he concept of personality traits as broad 
response predispositions is … untenable.”); Hartshorne and May, STUDIES IN THE NATURE 
OF CHARACTER, VOL. 1: STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928) (studying the consistency of behavior 
among schoolchildren). 
124 [Cite Newton and Keenan (1988), David-Blake and Pfeffer (1989), and others.]  
See also Rhode at 556-559 (citing research by Hartshorn and May). 
125 [Cite research by Walter Mischel, The Interaction of Person and Situation, in D. 
Magnusson & N.S. Endler (eds) Personality at the Crossroads: Current Issues in 
International Psychology, pp. 333-352 (1977), A. Davis-Blake and J. Pfeffer, Just a 
Mirage: The Search for Dispositional Effects in Organizational Researcg. Academy of 
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other hand, at least some analyses suggest that conscientiousness (the 
character trait that is arguably most relevant to discussions of 
professionalism, honesty, and trustworthiness) is fairly consistent across 
various situations, including in employment contexts.126   
Suffice it to say that social science research on the consistency of 
moral behavior as a whole has reached no clear conclusion as to whether 
character traits are generally consistent across various domains. Moreover, 
little empirical research has been done on the predictors of professional 
misconduct and discipline either in the legal or medical realms.127  Of 
course, lack of empirical support in an area where little empirical research 
has been done is not a reason reject the predictive argument altogether.  If a 
strong theoretical argument can be made in support of a connection between 
discrete elements of personal character and clinical harm to patients, then 
perhaps this hypothesis can be used to direct future empirical research about 
the predictive value of character-related misconduct.128  The core values 
                                                                                                                            
Management Review, 14, 385-400 (1989), and others.] barrack and mount, 1993, 
Autonomy as a moderator of the relations between the big five personality dimensions and 
job performance. J. Applied Psychology. 78. 111-118] 
126 Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions and 
Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis. 44 Personnel Psychology 1, at 17-18 (1991).  
According to this study, elements of conscientiousness include dependability, persistence, 
goal-directedness, and organization.  Id. at 4. 
127 See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale 
Law Journal, 491, 556 (1985) (summarizing research on predictors of attorney discipline).   
In the context of medical practice, most studies examining the predictors of clinical 
misconduct or disciplinary complaints look only at correlations with length of practice, 
gender, race, and other similar demographic characteristics.  See, e.g., James Morrison & 
Peter Wickersham, Physicians Disciplined by a State Medical Board, 279 JAMA 1889 
(June 17, 1998); Roberto Cardarelli, John C Licciardone & Gilbert Ramirez, Predicting 
Risk for Disciplinary Action by a State Medical Board, 100 Texas Medicine 84 (January 
2004).  Others look at medical school grades and examination scores, but not aspects of 
character or personality.  See, e.g., H. Hamdy et al., BEME Systematic Review: Predictive 
Values of Measurements Obtained in Medical Schools and Future Performance in Medical 
Practice, 28 Medical Teacher 103 (2006); Robyn Tamblyn et al., Physician Scores on a 
National Clinical Skills Examination as Predictors of Complaints to Medical Regulatory 
Authorities, 298 JAMA 993-1001 (September 5, 2007).   
The only marginally useful studies of predictors of medical misconduct reveal high 
rates of disciplinary recidivism, Darren Grant & Kelly C. Alfred, Sanctions and 
Recidivism: An Evaluation of Physician Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 Journal of 
Health Politics Policy and Law 867 (October 1, 2007), or a connection between 
“unprofessional conduct” in medical school and board discipline.  See Maxine A. 
Papadakis et al., Disciplinary Action by Medical Boards and Prior Behavior in Medical 
School, 353 N Engl J Med 2673 (December 22, 2005). 
128 Moreover, even if empirical research did demonstrate a link between personal 
character and safe medical practice, it is by no means clear that the existing system of 
medical licensure and discipline would be the most accurate or effective mechanism for 
evaluating personal character.  See Rhode at 556. 
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theory, particularly its emphasis on respect for fiduciary principles, aims to 
serve this purpose. 
These empirical questions, however, are not nearly as troubling as 
the fact that the prediction theory might justify disciplining physicians with 
any characteristics that correlate with medical misconduct or poor clinical 
judgment in the patient care setting, regardless of their relevance to fitness 
to practice. For example, imagine that a retrospective study of physician 
characteristics reveals that male OB/GYNs practicing in rural areas are 
statistically more likely to be found liable in patient malpractice suits.  
Would this justify preemptive discipline?129 Or, to choose an even more 
problematic example, imagine that physicians who engage in extramarital 
affairs are found fifty times more likely to face patient malpractice suits.  A 
prediction theorist could argue that those physicians’ lack of honesty in 
their personal relationships is predictive of dishonesty in their professional 
relationships.  But can it really be said that a physician who engages in 
extramarital affairs, or a male OB/GYN practicing in a rural area, is unfit to 
practice medicine, lacking the intrinsic characteristics of education, training, 
and character that form the foundation of competent medical practice?  It 
seems unlikely. If we are serious about the substantive due process 
limitation that demands that licensure and discipline requirements be 
rationally related to fitness to practice, the prediction theory is a poor 
substitute.  
 
B.  Trust Theory  
Similar problems arise when trust theories are used to justify 
disciplinary inquiries into character-related misconduct.  Trust theorists 
posit that misconduct outside the clinical sphere is a legitimate subject for 
professional discipline if it is likely to cause public distrust of medical 
profession.  In Kindschi, for example, the Washington Supreme Court 
identified the dual goals of professional discipline as protecting the public 
and protecting the “standing of the medical profession in the eyes of the 
public.”130  More recently, the court held that “conduct may indicate 
unfitness to practice medicine if it … lowers the standing of the medical 
profession in the public's eyes.”131   
Taking these statements at face value, it is difficult to understand 
                                                 
129 [Consider including a brief discussion of criminal law’s approach to prediction and 
preventive detention.] 
130 In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 826 (Wash. 1958). 
131 Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991); See also In 
re Lesansky, 17 P.3d 764, 767 (Cal. 2001) (“Attorney discipline is imposed when 
necessary ‘to protect the public, to promote confidence in the legal system, and to maintain 
high professional standards’”) 
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how inquiries into personal misconduct that lowers public opinion of the 
profession (but does not otherwise harm patients) relates to the state’s 
interests in protecting public health and welfare.  Indeed, few courts have 
ever expressly identified why the state’s police powers justify disciplinary 
action that serves only to protect the medical profession’s position in 
society.  Perhaps the strongest defense was provided by the Washington 
Supreme Court in Haley, where it affirmed that preserving medical 
professionalism “is not an end in itself,” but merely an “an instrumental end 
pursued in order to serve the State's legitimate interest in promoting and 
protecting the public welfare.”132  Wrote the court, “To perform their 
professional duties effectively, physicians must enjoy the trust and 
confidence of their patients. Conduct that lowers the public's esteem for 
physicians erodes that trust and confidence, and so undermines a necessary 
condition for the profession's execution of its vital role in preserving public 
health through medical treatment and advice.”133  This link between public 
trust and professional efficacy has been widely recognized by legal 
scholars, most notably by Mark Hall, who posits that trust is a fundamental 
element of the healing relationship,134 without which vulnerable patients 
would not be willing to seek care.135  Without systemic medical trust, Hall 
argues, the medical profession would not be able to effectively achieve the 
state’s goals in patient welfare and public health.136  Under this view, then, 
any behavior that diminishes patients’ confidence in the medical profession 
could be an appropriate subject for professional discipline. 
This approach towards character-related physician misconduct is 
problematic for the same reasons as the predictive theory.  Even accepting a 
connection between private misconduct and public trust in medicine, this 
kind of correlation alone may not be a strong enough justification for state 
intervention.  Patients may place faith in their physicians for any number of 
reasons – their religion, their affiliation with a particular hospital, their 
personal appearance – and it is by no means clear why a state should 
                                                 
132 Haley, 818 P.2d at 1070. 
133 Id.  
134 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 480 (2002). 
135 Hall, supra note 134, at 478; Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical 
Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 
614 (2002). 
136 See also Starr, supra note X, at 5 (addressing the importance of clinical authority to 
the therapeutic process); David Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the 
Provision of Medical Care, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 661 (1998) (describing the 
effects of erosion of trust on the effectiveness of medical interventions). However, 
empirical evidence of whether a single physician’s misconduct actually affects public trust 
in the profession as a whole (and whether disciplinary action taken by a state medical board 
actually serves to counteract this effect) is scarce and by no means conclusive.  See Hall, at 
496-98. 
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facilitate patient decisions that are based on non-clinical, irrelevant, or 
potentially discriminatory factors that have no clear link with fitness or 
competency to practice medicine.137  In defining a physician’s character by 
reference to public perception, courts have effectively defined it outside of 
the scope of fitness to practice, which under even a relatively 
uncontroversial definition speaks to the physician’s intrinsic capabilities in 
the realm of education, training, and character.  In contrast, when courts 
write about protecting the profession’s standing, they are describing a 
change in public perception, rather than a change in qualities intrinsic to the 
medical professional.  Defining the character element of fitness to practice 
by reference to public perception will not limit the scope of permissible 
professional discipline; rather, it has the potential to encompass even some 
categories of conduct that bear only the weakest connection to the state’s 
interest in protecting the public’s health and medical welfare.  For example, 
though a physician’s possession of two unregistered submachine guns may 
tend to “undermine public confidence in the integrity of the profession,” 138 
it is difficult to see how this fact alone would call into question the 
physician’s ability to practice medicine safely and with the best interests of 
patients at heart.  
Accordingly, although the argument from public trust may offer one 
explanation of how professional discipline serves the state’s police power 
goals, it alone is not an adequate justification for discipline that does not 
otherwise satisfy constitutional scrutiny.139   
 
C.  Social Contract Theory 
A final argument that can be made to justify professional discipline 
for character-related misconduct is grounded in social contract theory.  
While it may bear some similarities to the trust arguments described above, 
                                                 
137 See generally, R. Gatter, Faith, Confidence and Health Care: Fostering Trust in 
Medicine through Law, 39 Wake Forest Law Review 395 (2004) (distinguishing between 
trust as faith and trust as confidence in competence); see also Mark A. Hall, Caring, 
Curing and Trust: A Response to Gatter, 39 Wake Forest Law Review, 2004.  
138 See Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 443 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Mass. 
1982). 
139 Another common criticism is that that defining fitness to practice by reference to 
public trust is evidence of the profession’s “shallow vanity,” rather than any concern for 
public welfare.  See generally, Keith Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession’s 
Good Moral Character, 82 St. John's L. Rev. 1037, 1062 (2008) (“The bar is not concerned 
with reputable character in any meaningful sense. As we have seen, it routinely denies 
applicants of present reputable character. Such denials would be wholly arbitrary under a 
reputable character standard. Instead, the bar is more concerned with "reputable relational 
character" - that is, whether an applicant's past conduct is consistent with the bar's 
perceived self-image. This outlandish definition reconciles the cases - "fitness" to practice 
law is fitness to cohere with the bar's exalted self-image.”). 
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it is worth discussing in its own right.   
In the context of medicine, social contract theory posits that medical 
professionals are entitled to the privileges of exclusive licensure and self-
regulation only by virtue of an (implicit or explicit) agreement to take 
responsibility for the provision of important social goods140 and to hold 
themselves to higher standards of conduct than the general population.141  
Accordingly, if a physician breaches this social contract, the state would be 
justified in restricting his right to practice.  
The primary problem with this approach is that it not clear either 
that such a social contract exists, or that it binds physicians to particular 
standards of personal character or behavior.  After all, if reasonable 
decisionmakers can disagree as to whether tax fraud constitutes 
“unprofessional conduct” subject to professional discipline, it is difficult to 
conclude that there is a social contract between physicians and society 
prohibiting this behavior. Moreover, if we think of the many kinds of 
obligations that could be imposed on physicians as a condition of licensure 
but that American law fails to recognize in that context – for example, the 
obligation to provide uncompensated care to indigent patients,142 or the 
obligation to treat patients during a public health emergency even at their 
own risk143 – social contract theory seems even less relevant in justifying 
obligations with a more tenuous link to public health and patient safety.  
Indeed, social contract theory is typically used to defend professional 
ethical obligations, rather than legal obligations. 
Moreover, even assuming that physicians enter into a clear social 
contract prohibiting character-related misconduct when they receive their 
medical licenses, social contract theory faces the same problems as 
prediction theory and trust theories: while requiring that licensed 
professionals satisfy higher standards of character may serve the state’s 
goals in protecting public welfare, it runs afoul of the fitness to practice 
                                                 
140 See generally, Wilbert E. Moore, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES, 6 (1970); 
Michael D. Bayles, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 8-9 (1988); William M. Sullivan, WORK AND 
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141 See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 2; William M. Sullivan, What Is Left of 
Professionalism after Managed Care?, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 7, at 10-11 (Apr. 13, 
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142 Required by EMTALA and other laws, providing for fines in the case of 
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143 See Heidi Malm et al, Ethics, Pandemics, and the Duty to Treat, 8:8 Am. J. 
Bioethics 4 (Fall 2008); Nadia N. Sawicki, Without Consent: Moral Imperatives, Special 
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controversial Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, which attempts to tie physician 
licensure requirements to obligations during emergencies (Section 608). 
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limitation on professional licensure and discipline.  Given that our society 
imposes constitutional limitations on the exercise of state authority, a social 
contract to which the state is a party cannot violate these constitutional 
limitations.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
If there is to be any uniformity and consistency in medical 
discipline, state medical boards must exercise their disciplinary discretion 
pursuant to some guiding theory of professional discipline.  Moreover, this 
theory must be consistent with the guiding principles of professional 
discipline under American law – the primary concern of public protection, 
tempered by constitutional fitness to practice requirements that limit the 
scope of permissible disciplinary action.  This Article proposes a theory that 
identifies the core values essential for safe and effective medical practice, 
and authorizes discipline where a physician’s behavior demonstrates a 
failure to recognize those core values.  Of the key values that have been 
considered by medical boards and courts as relevant to professional fitness, 
the principle of fiduciary duty is the one most likely to garner consensus 
among lawmakers, patients, and medical professionals.  While it clearly 
limits the scope of professional discipline to misconduct deriving from a 
physician’s privileged position or clinical skills, it offers lawmakers, 
medical boards, and courts significant flexibility in determining what 
constitutes harm to a beneficiary. 
Compared to alternative theories of discipline, which threaten to 
encompass a wide variety of personal behavior that does not clearly 
implicate fitness to practice, the core values theory of discipline 
incorporates these constitutional limitations within its structure.  Moreover, 
it offers significant benefits in terms of consistency, identifying some 
categories of conduct as relevant to professional discipline, and 
categorically excluding others.  Finally, and most importantly, the core 
values theory offers a means by which boards can reevaluate their 
disciplinary priorities and increase their effectiveness in a budget-neutral 
manner. 
While efforts to more clearly delineate the scope of justifiable 
professional discipline may be misconstrued as inappropriately limiting 
medical boards’ ability to protect the public, these concerns are unfounded.  
The issue at hand is not whether boards are disciplining physicians often 
enough, but rather whether boards are exercising their disciplinary powers 
in the most effective and efficient manner.  Despite some recent expansions 
of authority, medical boards generally operate under significant financial 
and constraints, and necessarily maintain a system of triage in matters of 
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discipline.  The active pursuit of baseless or irrelevant complaints detracts 
from the boards’ ability to focus on professional misconduct that may have 
a far more direct impact on patient safety and the protection of public 
health.  Accordingly, both the effectiveness and the continued relevance of 
the current system of professional board discipline depend on a clear 
understanding of how it can justifiably be exercised. 
 
* * * 
